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I. INTRODUCTION 
We live in a world where infertility is no longer the problem of 
a miniscule part of our population.  Infertility now affects more 
than 7.3 million people in the United States alone and 
approximately one in eight United States couples.1
 
       † Theresa M. Erickson is a California attorney who founded Erickson Law, PC, 
which provides legal representation exclusively in the area of Reproductive Law.  
Erickson is active in the Reproductive Law community through policy and 
research with the American Bar Association and is also the Founder and CEO of 
Conceptual Options, LLC.  
      ††   Megan T. Erickson is a second year law student and plans to practice in the 
area of Reproductive Law upon graduation. 
 1. ABMA J., CHANDRA A., MOSHER W., PETERSON L., FERTILITY, FAMILY 
PLANNING, AND WOMEN’S HEALTH: NEW DATA FROM THE 1995 NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
FAMILY GROWTH, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, VITAL HEALTH STAT. 
23(19) (1997), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_019.pdf. 
  With new 
scientific breakthroughs, however, more and more people are 
turning to assisted reproductive technologies to aid them in their 
quest to have children. From this increase in infertility and the 
resulting use of assisted reproduction technologies (“ART”), the 
legal landscape is now forced to reassess areas of law that have been 
set in stone for decades, including the theories of contract law, 
1
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property law, tort law, constitutional law, criminal law, and family 
law.  Along with it, these new and often controversial technologies 
bring with them new legal obligations and issues for the parties 
involved—and the resulting children. 
One of the principal legal issues of ART, at the moment, 
regards the disposition of embryos2
It is through the debate of constitutional rights versus contract 
law, the debate over personhood versus property issues, and the use 
of the denial of the writ of certiorari in the case of Roman v. Roman
 and whether a couple that uses 
assisted reproductive technologies should be governed by the laws 
of contract or by the right to procreate.  More specifically, when the 
couple decides to divorce and cannot agree on the disposition of 
the embryos that they created through ART, the following 
questions must be asked: who should have the right to procreate 
and who should not?  Should the couple’s informed consent 
contract, which was signed before the creation of the embryos, 
trump the rights of the parties individually after the embryos are 
already in existence? 
3
II. BACKGROUND 
 
that we can finally develop an enhanced legal landscape upon 
which the ART community and its patients can turn to without 
worrying about the legal implications of their actions in a world 
where having children is often their most important goal and 
desire. 
The medical field of ART was developed in order to combat 
the increasing rates of infertility around the world.  ART, however, 
is not only a way for medicine to combat the physical aspects of 
infertility—there are also the psychological, cultural, and societal 
aspects of infertility that allow people to create what once seemed 
like the impossible: the families of which they have always dreamed.  
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”) 
 
 2. See, e.g., JUDITH F. DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 8 
(2006).  (For the purpose of this article “embryo” is not the most medically 
accurate term but is the most easily understood term.  Additionally, for the 
purpose of this article “embryo” will come to mean the same as the medically 
accurate term of “pre-embryo,” which means: “[t]he developing human organism 
during early cleaving stages, which immediately follow fertilization, until 
development of the embryo.  The preembryonic period immediately follows the 
zygote stage and ends at approximately 14 days after fertilization with the 
development of the primitive streak”).  Id. 
 3. Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex.App. 2006). 
2
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defines infertility as: 
[A] disease of the reproductive system that impairs one of 
the body’s most basic functions: the conception of 
children. Conception is a complicated process that 
depends upon many factors: on the production of healthy 
sperm by the man and healthy eggs by the woman; 
unblocked fallopian tubes that allow the sperm to reach 
the egg; the sperm’s ability to fertilize the egg when they 
meet; the ability of the fertilized egg (embryo) to become 
implanted in the woman’s uterus; and sufficient embryo 
quality.4
As stated above, infertility affects more than 7.3 million people 
in the United States for various reasons, and those struggling with 
this problem are usually run through a battery of tests to determine 
the specific cause of their infertility.
 
5  Out of those tested, nearly 
44% of cases are attributed to male factor infertility, 33% are 
attributed to female tubal factors, 25% attribute infertility to 
problems with female ovulation, and approximately 5 to 10% will 
have no readily apparent cause for their infertility even after they 
have completed the recommended testing.6
No matter what the cause, for the majority of these 
approximately 7.3 million people, the resulting diagnosis of 
infertility and its effects are ultimately devastating to the couple 
and their relationship.  While support and advocacy organizations 
like RESOLVE,
 
7 AFA,8 and INCIID9 believe infertility should be 
treated as a medical condition and a disability that has a cure and 
not a “death sentence,” the Americans with Disabilities Act10
 
 4. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Frequently Asked 
Questions About Fertility, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2008). 
 5. See ABMA J., ET AL. supra note 1. 
 6. AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, INFERTILITY: AN OVERVIEW 
12 (2003), http://www.asrm.org/Patients/patientbooklets/infertility_overview.pdf 
(last visited on Nov. 25, 2008) [hereinafter AN OVERVIEW]. 
 7. Resolve: The National Infertility Association, www.resolve.org (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2008). 
 8. American Fertility Association, www.theafa.org (last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
 9. The International Council on Infertility Information Dissemination, Inc., 
www.inciid.org (last visited on Nov. 25, 2008). 
 10. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 12101 (2000)). 
 
(“ADA”) does not consider infertility to be a disability because it is 
not “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
3
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or more of the major life activities of”11
ART is defined as “the various medical techniques used to 
achieve a pregnancy by means other than sexual intercourse . . . 
[it] is used when an individual [or couple] is unable to have a child 
through the age-old process that combines egg and sperm inside a 
woman’s body.”
 an individual.  No matter 
how one chooses to look at the devastation of infertility, ART 
remains a viable solution to infertile couples. 
12  Some of the most common examples of ART are 
in vitro fertilization (“IVF”),13 gamete intrafallopian transfer 
(“GIFT”),14 intracytoplasmic sperm injection (“ICSI”),15 
intrauterine insemination (“IUI”),16 and zygote intrafallopian 
transfer (“ZIFT”).17
Although ART initially focused on bypassing non-functioning 
reproductive organs, it has become more complex.  It moved from 
merely involving the infertile couple and their doctor, to involving 
 
 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000); see, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 
633 (1998). 
 12. DAAR, supra note 2, at 1. 
 13. In vitro fertilization (“IVF”) is defined as: “a method of assisted 
reproduction that involves surgically removing eggs from the woman’s ovaries, 
combining them with sperm in the laboratory and, if fertilized, replacing the 
resulting embryo into the woman’s uterus.”  The Midwest Center of Reproductive 
Health, P.A., Glossary of Terms (2006), http://www.mcrh.com/resources. 
glossary.php. 
 14. Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (“GIFT”) is defined as: “[a] medical 
procedure in which a woman’s eggs are retrieved following ovarian stimulation, 
mixed in the laboratory with sperm, and reintroduced into the fallopian tube 
using a fiber-optic instrument called a laparoscope which is inserted through small 
incisions in the woman’s abdomen. . . .  [I]n order to use GIFT, a woman must 
have at least one healthy fallopian tube.”  DAAR, supra note 2, at 41. 
 15. Intracytoplasmic sperm injection (“ICSI”) is defined as: “a 
micromanipulation technique used in conjunction with IVF that involves injecting 
a sperm directly into an egg in order to facilitate fertilization.  The fertilized egg is 
then transferred to the uterus.”  AN OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 15. 
 16. Intrauterine insemination (“IUI”) is defined as: “the process whereby 
sperm are injected directly into the uterine cavity in order to bypass the cervix and 
place the sperm closer to the egg.  The sperm are usually washed first in order to 
remove chemicals that can irritate the uterine lining and to increase sperm 
motility and concentration.”  Id. 
 17. Zygote intrafallopian transfer (“ZIFT”) is defined as: “[a] medical 
procedure in which a woman’s eggs are retrieved following ovarian stimulation, 
mixed in the laboratory with sperm, and allowed to develop into early embryos 
(also called zygotes, usually seen approximately one day after fertilization).  The 
zygotes are transferred into a woman’s fallopian tubes using a laparoscope, placed 
through the woman’s abdomen, to guide placement of the early embryos.  ZIFT 
combines some of the laboratory elements of IVF and the tubal transfer of GIFT.”  
DAAR, supra note 2, at 41. 
4
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ovum donors, sperm donors, and/or surrogates, which only further 
increases the complexity of not only the social and cultural issues, 
but most importantly the legal issues associated with ART.  
Moreover, most states do not have laws regarding ART and the use 
of third-party participants, which generates additional legal issues 
when determining what technologies are permitted in which states.  
Regardless of the parties, the creation of the embryos through ART 
involves legal issues such as what to do with those embryos once a 
patient or patients have decided that they no longer have any use 
for their excess embryos.  It is estimated that there are more than 
400,000 embryos in cryopreserved18 storage in the United States 
alone;19 that number grows with each passing year.  There are many 
options for these patients who have already completed their fertility 
treatments successfully or have decided not to continue with 
fertility treatments.  Some of the alternatives for their excess 
embryos include: donation to research or another couple, 
discarding/destroying the embryos, or maintaining the embryos in 
a cryopreserved state—although the longer an embryo is 
cryopreserved, the less chance it has of “surviving” the thawing 
process.20
With all of these options, reputable fertility clinics ensure that 
each patient signs an embryo disposition document, which, along 
with his or her informed consent, clarifies how the patient would 
like to handle the disposition of his or her embryos once the 
patient has decided to cease treatment (albeit most often without 
legal representation).  Yet, not all of the options listed above are 
available in every state.  For example, donating embryos to research 
is illegal in states such as Louisiana and Kentucky, which have laws 
prohibiting the destruction of viable embryos.  Louisiana Revised 
Statute section 129 states: “[A] viable in vitro fertilized human 
ovum is a juridical
 
21 person,22
 
 18. Cryopreservation: the maintenance of viability of excised tissues [and/or] 
organs at extremely low temperatures.  STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 416 (26th 
ed. 1995). 
 19. David I. Hoffman, et al., Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States and Their 
Availability for Research, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063 (2003). 
 20. Id.  Approximately 35% of cryopreserved embryos do not survive the 
freezing and thawing process of cryopreservation and of those that do survive 
these processes, only approximately 25% will survive to reach the day-5-blastocyst 
stage.  Id. 
 21. Juridical: relating to administration of justice, or office of a judge.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 867 (8th ed. 2008). 
 which shall not be intentionally, 
 22. Even though a Louisiana Statute describes viable embryos as a “person” in 
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destroyed by any natural or other juridical person or through the 
actions of another such person.”23
In states that do allow performing research on embryos, there 
are also laws to ensure that the patient is fully aware and consents 
to a specific type of research for which his or her excess embryos will 
be used.  One such state that has a law of this type is California,
 
24 
which ensures that a fertility clinic will only be able to use those 
specific embryos for a specific type of research and not for any 
research for which it feels the embryos will be effective.25
Some state legislatures have responded by drafting these laws 
(specified above or not) in record time to ensure that the 
disposition of each embryo is legally accounted for and that the 
wishes of each patient are taken into account.  The law, however, 
continues to be bombarded with new and complex issues of law 
and public policy due to the increasing rates of diagnosed infertility 
and the rapid advancement of ART around the world, especially 
since the first “test tube” baby was born in the late 1970s.
 
26
III. ANALYSIS 
  It is 
because of the advancement of these technologies that the laws in 
the state and federal judicial systems have been fundamentally 
unable to keep up with their development.  This lack of legal 
development has created a black hole in the area of ART and the 
law.  Many legal questions have been only partially answered, or not 
answered at all, leaving doctors, patients, and legal practitioners 
with an incomplete path to follow. 
A. Constitutional Law v. Contract Law 
The legal landscape of ART becomes all the more complex 
when a couple divorces and cannot agree on who should be able to 
make the decisions regarding the disposition of their frozen 
embryos.  Although the law itself has attempted to make these 
 
the judicial sense, most states do not give the status of personhood to embryos, 
especially those that are existing in cryopreserved space outside of a woman’s 
womb.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 129 (2008). 
 23. Id. 
 24. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125315 (2008). 
 25. See generally id. (discussing the process for obtaining a donor’s consent). 
 26. The world’s first “test tube” baby was Louise Brown, born in 1978.  BBC 
HOME, 1978: First ‘Test Tube Baby’ Born, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/25/newsid_2499000/2499411.stm (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2008). 
6
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decisions, there are only a handful of cases (often with no binding 
precedent) that are available to aid the judicial system in 
determining whether the disposition of embryos should be 
analyzed under contract law or as a constitutional right to have or 
not to have children, which is defined as procreative liberty.  
Professor John Robertson described procreative liberty as follows: 
[As] a matter of constitutional law, procreative liberty is a 
negative right against state interference with choices to 
procreate or to avoid procreation.  It is not a right against 
private interference, though other laws might provide that 
protection.  Nor is it a positive right to have the state or 
particular persons provide the means or resources 
necessary to have or avoid having children. 27
In her article The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of “Coerced 
Parenthood” in Frozen Embryo Disputes, Ellen Waldman asserts that the 
constitutional right to have children is the only right that should be 
upheld.
 
If Robertson is correct in this assumption, however, which one 
of the divorcing parties’ rights supersedes that of the other?  By 
focusing on a constitutional right to procreative liberty, the judicial 
system would be proactively creating a selective bias that favors one 
party’s constitutional rights over the other’s.  With that in mind, 
the end result would ultimately negate the actual purpose of these 
“rights” in the first place. 
28  She states that “[w]hen considering the burdens of 
forced paternity . . . [l]egislators could relieve objecting spouses of 
their concern over financial liability by simply treating objecting 
spouses as nothing more than sperm donors.”29  However, this 
would take years because one currently does not have the legal 
right to contract out of any potential financial obligations to a 
child.30
Yet, simply legislating out of parental rights does not always 
wrap everything up into a tidy gift-wrapped package.  It actually 
completely bypasses many parties’ beliefs (those who want to avoid 
 
 
 27. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 23 (Princeton University Press 1994). 
 28. Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the Myth of “Coerced Parenthood” 
in Frozen Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1021, 1060 (2004). 
 29. Id. at 1037. 
 30. Id.; see also Grijalva v. Grijalva, 310 S.E.2d 193, 197 (W. Va. 1983) (The 
court ruled that parents are not able to contract away the rights of their children 
because the aspect of financial support of a child is not for the other parent, but 
instead the right of the child to have both parents financially obligated to support 
him or her).  Id. 
7
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procreation) that they will be psychologically impacted by the 
knowledge that they have a child somewhere in the world.  
Waldman goes on in her article to use a balancing test to make her 
argument against this premise by stating that in order to decide 
which right should be favored, the judicial system needs to 
determine the burdens as follows: “[w]hether the burdens of 
unwanted paternity to the ‘would-not-be-father’ exceed the 
deprivation of a possibly last opportunity for maternity to the 
‘would-be-mother.’”31
Waldman uses this balancing test to assert that there would be 
no psychological burden on the party attempting to avoid 
procreation because parenthood—“or at least fatherhood—is, in 
large part, socially constructed rather than biologically pre-
determined.”
 
32  Waldman argues that there should not be a 
constitutional right to avoid procreation because there are no 
undue burdens upon the party needing to be protected from 
unwarranted governmental intrusions.33
Waldman’s point of view, however, is not supported by the 
majority of rulings decided in this area.  Instead, when the judiciary 
has used the concepts of constitutional law as a way to decide these 
cases, they have, for the most part, decided in favor of the party 
attempting to avoid procreation.  One example of such a decision 
was Davis v. Davis.
 
34  In Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court was 
the first state supreme court to be confronted with the issue of 
embryo disposition.35
In Davis, both parties had participated in the creation of 
embryos together during their marriage; but, after multiple 
attempts to achieve a viable pregnancy, the couple divorced and 
was left with seven cryopreserved—frozen—embryos.
 
36
While going through their infertility treatments, the couple 
did not enter into any agreement as to how the excess embryos 
would be disposed of if they divorced.
 
37
 
 31. Waldman, supra note 28, at 1060. 
 32. Id. at 1028. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 592. 
 37. Id. 
  Following their divorce, 
Junior Davis sought to have the seven embryos discarded, while his 
ex-wife Mary Sue Davis wanted the remaining embryos to be 
8
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donated to another infertile couple.38  Since they did not have a 
prearranged contract regarding the disposition of the embryos, the 
court looked to the balancing of each party’s interests regarding 
the disposition.39
[T]he two aspects of procreational autonomy—the right 
to procreate and the right to avoid procreation . . .[from 
which they would begin looking at] by considering the 
burdens imposed on the parties by solutions that would 
have the effect of disallowing the exercise of individual 
procreational autonomy with respect to these particular 
preembryos.
  The Supreme Court of Tennessee stated that the 
central issue to the case was: 
40
The court ultimately held that Junior Davis was allowed full 
control over the seven remaining embryos because Mary Sue Davis 
had other means of achieving parenthood and she was attempting 
to donate the embryos to another childless couple for the purpose 
of their conceiving a child.
 
41  This result would essentially cause 
Junior to have the greater interest, as he would still have the 
psychological burden of knowing that he possibly has a child or 
children out in the world.42
On the other end of the spectrum, the New York Court of 
Appeals in 1998 came to their decision in Kass v. Kass
 
43 by relying 
on contract law and the enforceability of disposition agreements, 
instead of using a constitutional analysis as in Davis.  Maureen Kass 
(appellant) and Steven Kass (respondent) had signed four 
informed consent forms which provided a “statement of 
disposition” should they get divorced.44  They were left with five 
frozen, stored embryos.45  Their informed consent forms stated that 
their excess embryos should be disposed of and used for research 
by the IVF program.46
 
 38. Id. at 590. 
 39. Id. at 603–04. 
 40. Id. at 603. 
 41. Id. at 604. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d (N.Y. 1998). 
 44. Id. at 176. 
 45. See id. at 177. 
 46. See id. at 176–77. 
  Once the parties divorced, they also created 
an “uncontested divorce” agreement that they both signed stating 
that the “[t]he disposition of the frozen 5 pre-zygotes at Mather 
Hospital is that they should be disposed of [in] the manner 
9
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outlined in our consent form and that neither Maureen Kass[,] 
Steve Kass[,] or anyone else will lay claim to custody of these pre-
zygotes.”47
Barely one month after signing this additional agreement, the 
appellant (Mrs. Kass) commenced an action in New York to receive 
full custody of the embryos.
 
48  The trial court in the original case 
decided that the appellant had full rights to the embryos, yet the 
New York Supreme Court Appellate Division reversed this decision 
stating that their prior agreements should control the outcome of 
this decision.49  The New York Court of Appeals ultimately 
determined after its review of the case that the Appellate Division 
decision should be affirmed because both parties had clearly 
expressed their intentions for the disposition of their embryos 
prior to their divorce and subsequently with their uncontested 
divorce agreement.50  The Court decided that procreation 
avoidance outweighed the woman’s right to engage in 
reproduction with the frozen embryos by interpreting the contract 
to support that result.51
That same year the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
decided the convoluted case of A.Z. v. B.Z.
 
52 on the basis of 
enforceability of contracts and dismissed the argument that the 
respondent (B.Z.) had a greater constitutional right than the 
appellant (A.Z.) to the disposition of their remaining embryos.53  
The appellant appealed from the issuance of a permanent 
injunction against her from using the remaining embryos that were 
created while she and the respondent were married.54
 
 47. Id. at 177. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. (stating that “when parties to an IVF procedure have themselves 
determined the disposition of any unused fertilized egg, their agreement should 
control.”). 
 50. See id. at 182 (stating that “[t]hese parties have clearly manifested their 
intention, the law will honor it.”). 
 51. See Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy 
Process: Developing an Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 455, 470–71 (1999) (stating that “Maureen Kass probably did not intend that 
her husband would be able to override her desire to implant the embryos; 
therefore, a finding that this was her clearly expressed intent seems highly 
suspect.”). 
 52. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000). 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. at 1055. 
  As in Kass, 
the parties had signed informed consents from their fertility clinic 
10
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regarding the disposition of their remaining embryos.55  These 
forms were preprinted with choices regarding the disposition if the 
parties were to become separated, as well as having an additional 
blank line permitting the parties to select an option not listed.56  
The consent also listed that “[t]he consent form also informs the 
donors that they may change their minds as to any disposition, 
provided that both donors convey that fact in writing to the clinic.”57
Although the parties signed a total of seven consent forms, the 
court found that only the form signed over the course of their 
infertility treatments in August 1991 governed the remaining 
frozen embryos.
 
58  Apparently, the respondent had signed the 
blank consent forms prior to the fertility treatments and gave them 
back to the appellant to prepare and sign.59  The appellant then 
signed all of the forms and filled in the blank space for the 
disposition granting all remaining embryos to her (the appellant) if 
they were to separate.60  The lower probate court ruled in favor of 
the respondent, stating that there was no evidence that the 
respondent agreed at the time of his signing of the agreements that 
if they were to become separated that the embryos would 
automatically go to the appellant.61
These cases indicate that there needs to be uniformity among 
courts as to how clinics can ensure that their patients sign valid and 
enforceable disposition forms.  These cases further indicate that 
any result should not be made on the selective basis of whose 
procreational rights outweigh the other or by choosing whose 
procreational right was more important than the other’s.  If this 
line of reasoning is followed, it would completely negate what 
United States Supreme Court Justice Brennan stated in Eisenstadt v. 
Baird: “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 
 
62
Under this viewpoint, if the courts were to use constitutional 
rights to decide whether one should have a child (in the sense of 
 
 
 55. Id. at 1053. 
 56. Id. at 1054. 
 57. Id. (emphasis added). 
 58. See id. at n.10. 
 59. Id. at 1054. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 1054–55. 
 62. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
11
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ART only), it would be purely unconstitutional.  It is only with a 
compelling state interest that the government can interfere, as 
decided in Carey v. Population Services International.63  In Carey, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that for the government to step 
in and decide cases such as these, there would need to be a 
compelling state interest: “[W]here a decision as fundamental as that 
whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a 
burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and 
must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests.”64
Furthermore, in embryo disposition cases, using a 
constitutional basis to decide disputes where a valid and 
enforceable disposition contract is present would not constitute a 
compelling state interest under the law because unlike fetuses, 
embryos are not viable children that the state needs to protect.
 
65  
Instead, we need to remember that embryos in a petri dish or 
frozen in a tank are actually “pre-embryos.”66
B. Personhood Versus Property Issues Related to Embryo Disposition 
 
Ultimately, courts in the United States should base their 
decisions on the enforceability of these contracts of disposition if 
the contracts indeed exist.  In order for the courts to be able to use 
this as an option for their decisions, the legal community and the 
fertility clinics need to create and make available contracts for 
disposition that are separate and not simply part of their informed 
consent documents.  Each fertility clinic should require all of their 
patients to sign disposition of embryos agreements that have been 
drafted and reviewed by attorneys with the patients prior to the 
treatment commencing, and possibly after the treatment has 
concluded.  If this procedure were followed, it is more likely that 
the majority of these agreements would hold up in court as 
binding, legal agreements that would follow the rules of other 
enforceable contracts. 
Another aspect of embryos and their disposition that makes 
the legal landscape much more complicated is the debate over 
 
 63. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).  In Carey, 
the United States Supreme Court declared the New York statute criminalizing the 
sale or distribution of contraceptives to minors under the age of sixteen 
unconstitutional.  Id. 
 64. Id. at 686 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973)). 
 65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2008). 
 66. See DAAR, supra note 2. 
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whether embryos should be considered legal persons or property.  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines person as:  
a human being (i.e. natural person) . . . [the] scope and 
delineation of [the] term is necessary for determining 
those to whom [the] Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution affords protection since this Amendment 
expressly applies to ‘person’ . . . [the] word ‘person’ as 
used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the 
unborn.67
that which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which 
belongs exclusively to one.  In the strict legal sense, an 
aggregate of right which are guaranteed and protected by 
the government. . . . More specifically, ownership; the 
unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing the right to 
dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, 
and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it.
 
Under this strict legal definition of a person, an embryo (or 
pre-embryo as discussed earlier and which is not yet a viable fetus) 
would not be considered a person under the law.  Property, 
however, is defined as: 
68
The article Individuals, Humans, and Persons: The Issue of Moral 
Status, by Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, rejects the idea that 
human embryos should be considered distinct human individuals 
that are afforded the full rights of personhood.
 
Embryos, however, do not neatly fit under this definition of 
property, either, because they cannot be disposed of in every state 
and no one party holds exclusive rights to them.  This conclusion 
illustrates that when it comes to embryos, the legal rights are not 
exact.  Rather, they are somewhere in between both definitions. 
69  Instead, they 
argue that an embryo should be considered to be “the potential to 
become one or more different individuals,”70
In Davis, the Supreme Court of Tennessee analyzed this exact 
issue in determining the legal status of the Davis’ embryos (and 
embryos in general).  The court determined that under Tennessee 
 which would mean 
that the embryo should have a special status under the law while 
not being considered a full person with all of the rights afforded 
under “personhood.” 
 
 67. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1382 (4th ed. 1968). 
 68. Id. at 845. 
 69. See Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, Individuals, Humans, and Persons: The Issue 
of Moral Status, EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION 65–75 (1990). 
 70. Id. at 75. 
13
Erickson and Erickson: What Happens to Embryos When a Marriage Dissolves? Embryo Disposi
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
482 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:2 
law, as “embryos develop, they are accorded more respect than 
mere human cells because of their burgeoning potential for 
[human] life.”71  The court, however, did not believe that embryos 
should be afforded the full rights and respects of personhood 
because they only had the potential to become human life, while the 
embryos were not yet at the stage in which they could be 
considered human life—legally.72  The court also went on to say 
that a person’s embryo could not be afforded the full rights of 
personhood simply because of its potential.  Unlike a fetus, it had 
yet to reach the developmental stage of individuality.73  Using these 
arguments, the court in Davis held that “[embryos] are not, strictly 
speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim 
category that entitles them to special respect because of their 
potential for human life.”74  Yet, they also held that the parties did 
have an interest in the ownership of the embryos because they were 
allowed to make the decisions based upon the disposition of these 
embryos.75
Another case that explores the arguments of personhood 
versus property is Litowitz v. Litowitz
 
76 in which the petitioner sought 
ownership over two cryopreserved embryos that were the product 
of donor egg and her ex-husband’s (the respondent) sperm.  The 
respondent wished to donate their remaining embryos to another 
couple, while the petitioner wished to implant the remaining 
embryos into a surrogate77 and to bring the embryos to term.78  The 
Superior Court of Pierce County awarded full custody to the 
respondent, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision 
reasoning that the embryos were not biologically related to the 
petitioner.79
On further appeal, the court determined that when the parties 
 
 
 71. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992). 
 72. Id. at 596.  The Davis court also explained that embryos could not be 
considered the same as a human because “the ‘tissue’ involved here does have the 
potential for developing into independent human life, even if it is not yet legally 
recognizable as human life itself.”  Id. at 595. 
 73. Id. at 595. 
 74. Id. at 597. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002). 
 77. The surrogate or surrogate mother is also the gestational carrier.  A third 
party that is not either of the parties in this case and not biologically connected in 
any way to the embryos or resulting child (if there were one).  See generally id. 
 78. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 264. 
 79. Id. at 265–68. 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/12
  
2009] EMBRYO DISPOSITION AND DIVORCE 483 
commenced the egg donation process, they signed a contract that 
stated that the donated eggs belonged to both parties with the 
petitioner being considered the “intended mother” of any child 
produced from the resulting embryos.80  In the petitioner’s Writ of 
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Washington, she argued that 
the state of California ruled that human byproducts (including 
sperm) cannot be deemed property per se81 because “one could 
not have a right in one’s own genetic material.”82  Ultimately, the 
court held that the couple was required to follow the terms of their 
embryo disposition agreement with the clinic.83
IV. EMBRYO DISPOSITION TODAY: ENHANCED LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
THROUGH ROMAN v. ROMAN 
 
When applying all of the definitions and rulings of the various 
cases above, it is evident that the status of embryos remains a gray 
area within the legal field.  If a case such as Litowitz came before a 
court in Louisiana, a different result would likely follow as the party 
requesting destruction would certainly fail due to the statutory 
restrictions in that state. 
While a ruling by the United States Supreme Court regarding 
the status of embryos would likely give the legal community a 
bright line precedent as to what the exact status of embryos are 
under the law, this could also backfire for the assisted reproductive 
community, especially if the Court ruled that embryos should be 
considered full persons—making many aspects of ART illegal 
throughout the country.  Nevertheless, there needs to be a guiding 
principle regarding embryo disposition that can be used 
throughout the fertility community to allow ART to continue with 
its many needed breakthroughs.  This needs to be accomplished 
while providing a roadmap for doctors, patients, and legal 
practitioners, especially since interstate travel is often a common 
necessity for many couples turning to ART. 
One case that illustrates how the United States Supreme Court 
would likely rule in a case of embryo disposition is Roman v. 
Roman,84
 
 80. Id. at 268. 
 81. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Wash. 1990). 
 82. Id. at 490. 
 83. Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 271. 
 84. Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. Civ. App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 
S.Ct. 2469 (2008). 
 which was denied certiorari in March of 2008.  Roman is a 
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Texas case that was initiated after Augusta Roman 
(petitioner/wife) and Randy Roman (respondent/husband) 
divorced and the petitioner attempted to use the embryos that they 
had created to become pregnant on her own.85
The disagreement between the parties actually began the night 
before the parties had planned the implantation of their created 
embryos.  Instead of implanting the embryos the next day, they had 
the remaining three cryopreserved in the interim until they could 
both agree on what would be the best course of action.
 
86  
Unfortunately, they were unable to agree on the disposition of 
these cryopreserved embryos and subsequently divorced.87  This 
dispute over their cryopreserved embryos arose from that divorce,88 
even though they had both signed an informed consent form at 
their fertility clinic stating how the embryos would be used if they 
were to divorce.89
 3. Is the fundamental right to enter into familial relationships 
violated by a judicial order denying implantation of embryos by a 
genetic parent who is unable to conceive or bear a child by other 
 
Although writ was denied, the legal field may be able to 
deduce what the Supreme Court’s opinion would be in such cases 
of embryo disposition by looking to both parties’ petitions to the 
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent denial. 
In the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari the petitioner, Augusta 
Roman, presented three questions for the Justices to decide: 
 1. Is the fundamental right to procreate violated by a judicial 
order denying implantation of embryos by a genetic parent who is 
unable to conceive or bear a biological child by other means? 
 2. Does the constitutional liberty interest in deciding whether to 
bear or beget a child encompass a right to deny implantation of 
embryos in a genetic parent who desires the implantation? 
 
 85. Id. at 43. 
 86. Brief for Randy M. Roman in Opposition No. 07-926 at 8, Roman v. 
Roman, 128 S.Ct. 2469 (2008). 
 87. Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 43. 
 88. The Texas trial court awarded custody of the embryos to Augusta as 
“property,” to which Randy hastily appealed.  Id.  The Texas Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court’s ruling, granting the embryos to Randy by enforcing the 
contract that the parties signed at the fertility clinic.  Id. at 55. 
 89. Id. at 44. 
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means?90
Each of these questions presented by the petitioner dealt 
directly with the Constitutional right to have children in opposition 
to the Constitutional right to avoid procreation, which is the most 
argued issue in embryo disposition cases.  The petitioner also 
argued that this was her last chance to have biological children 
because at the age of 46 she was too old to successfully complete 
another cycle of IVF.
 
91  The respondent revealed (outside of court 
documents), however, that he offered to pay for another IVF cycle 
for the petitioner with the use of donor sperm immediately 
following their divorce.92
 4. Should the in vitro fertilization industry be fundamentally 
changed by ruling unenforceable the almost universally used 
agreements between clinics and prospective parents concerning 
disposition of frozen pre-embryos?
 
In opposition, the respondent presented the following 
questions to the Court: 
 1. Can prospective parents, by signing a standard contract 
required by almost all fertility clinics before they begin the in vitro 
fertilization process, waive whatever constitutional rights to 
procreate they may have in the event of divorce? 
 2.  Can the procreation right of a woman who has less than a 
1% chance of successfully using frozen pre-embryos to create a 
child and who has other much more likely options for having 
children outweigh the right of a man who does not want to be 
forced by the government or his ex-wife to have a child against his 
will? 
 3. Does the United States Constitution even recognize an 
absolute right to procreate that justifies overruling the decisions of 
all state courts that have addressed disputes over frozen pre-
embryos, not to mention the European Court of Human Rights? 
93
The respondent also argued that “[i]f there [were] a 
constitutional right at issue in this case, it [would be] the right to 
 
 
 90. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Roman v. Roman, 128 S.Ct. 2469 
(No. 07-926) at i. 
 91. Id. at 5 n.1. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Brief for Randy M. Roman in Opposition No. 07-926 at i, Roman, 128 S.Ct. 
2469 (2008). 
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decide whether or not to beget a child, a right”94
[T]he in vitro fertilization industry [should] be 
fundamentally changed by ruling unenforceable the 
almost universally used agreements between clinics and 
prospective parents concerning disposition of frozen 
[embryos].
 that he had as well 
and with which the European Court of Human Rights and six state 
supreme courts all agree.  Therefore, deciding this case based on 
one’s constitutional rights would effectively mean denying the 
constitutional rights of another. 
Furthering the arguments against using a constitutional right 
approach in these cases, the respondent argued in his Brief in 
Opposition to the granting of the Writ of Certiorari whether: 
95
This proposition begs the question of whether contract or 
constitutional law should be the guiding area of law for all embryo 
disposition disputes so that couples can continue to use ART to 
create their families.  The respondent additionally asserted that the 
petitioner had “waived [her constitutional] right by signing the 
contract with the clinic that clearly [stated that] any frozen pre-
embryos [would] be discarded in the event of divorce.”
 
96  
According to United States law a person may waive his or her 
constitutional rights in civil court just as he or she can in criminal 
court.97
In denying this Writ of Certiorari, the legal and medical field 
can deduce that if the Supreme Court were to grant the hearing of 
such a case, the court would most likely rule based on contract law 
if a binding and enforceable contract existed between the parties 
that contracted away their constitutional rights to procreate or to 
avoid procreation.
  In essence, by signing that binding and enforceable 
contract with the fertility clinic, the petitioner had lost all of her 
constitutional rights to procreate using those particular embryos, 
although she still had the constitutional right to procreate by other 
means. 
98
 
 94. Id. at 12. 
 95. Id. at i. 
 96. Id. at 18. 
 97. Overmyer Co. v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972). 
 98. See id. 
  This is why the ART community needs to 
ensure that patients are signing valid, enforceable disposition 
agreements under the guidance of an attorney. 
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In fact, Dahl v. Angle,99 the Oregon Court of Appeals recently 
determined that the fate of the couple’s remaining embryos would 
be handled according to the embryo disposition form the couple 
had agreed upon and signed at the time of the creation of the 
embryos.  Interestingly enough, the majority, also citing Davis in its 
argument, stated that the embryos did constitute a matter of 
private property, although the justices narrowly avoided calling 
them “property.”100
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the minimal case law that exists and the unlikely 
intervention by the United States Supreme Court, the law 
regarding embryo disposition currently rests in a gray area with no 
truly consistent or binding rulings, creating legal turmoil and 
uncertainties for lawyers, doctors, and parties alike.  As 
practitioners, however, we need to focus on whether a contract (if 
one exists) between the parties is enforceable.  We also need to 
realize that “if these agreements mean nothing and are rendered 
useless,”101
Even if they result in litigation, the courts will likely rule in 
favor of the intention(s) expressed in the embryo disposition 
agreement as each party should have reviewed the agreement with 
 the fertility industry has the potential to remain at a 
standstill with each case being litigated to determine the parties’ 
true intentions simply because one party decided that he or she did 
not want to follow his or her specified intent from his or her signed 
contract with the fertility clinic.  As we have seen in the preceding 
matters, the lack of contracts regarding disposition leaves parties 
with the constitutional balancing test of Kass, which ultimately will 
be affected by the state in which the embryos reside. 
The legal and medical communities can lessen this chance for 
confusion and resulting litigation, however, by working together to 
draft binding and enforceable embryo disposition agreements for 
each patient to sign.  Each patient should review this agreement 
with an attorney prior to signing it with the fertility clinic.  By 
following these procedures, it is likely that these agreements will be 
held enforceable. 
 
 99. Dahl v. Angle, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. App. 2008). 
 100. See id. at 840–41. 
 101. Brief for Randy M. Roman in Opposition No. 07-926 at 19, Roman v. 
Roman, 128 S.Ct. 2469 (2008). 
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an attorney who would have further revised the agreement to meet 
the full intentions of each party.  With that in mind, the parties and 
their medical practitioner(s) can insure that what is actually 
intended at the signing of this agreement will, in fact, be the end 
result.  Creating enforceable, binding agreements is the least that 
can be done by the courts, medical practitioners and legal 
professionals, considering that the law does not classify embryos as 
persons or as property.  It is clear, however, that embryos hold a 
special and unique status in the law. 
 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/12
